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port of such a joint mediation committee fails of acceptance, provision is made that any places remaining vacant shall be filled by the vote of the judges who already have been selected to compose the court. If the Assembly and the Council should not agree to this panel thus selected, the powers of the Assembly and Council shall be considered as defaulted, and the choice as finally made shall stand. Thus, in any event, the selection of the judges is assured.

The plan is felt, therefore, to meet every conceivable difficulty. The original nomination of candidates by a body such as The Hague Court of Arbitral Justice assures the choice not only of the best qualified, but of men truly representative of the various judicial systems of the world. Under the plan of selection as proposed, the court can and will be brought into existence. Even if the League of Nations should cease to be, the court can go on.

Here we have an international policy to which all nations and all parties can subscribe. There is nothing here of coercion of States except that coercion of public opinion, the only sanction of any peaceful settlement of international disputes. True, this is only the judicial branch of the Society of Nations that is to be. True, the political branch must be developed also. The creation of the new laws by duly selected representatives of all the nations, laws which shall be returned to the various powers for ratification, is also necessary. Hence there must be the equivalent of a Third Hague Conference, periodical and permanent. If only the present so-called League of Nations could eliminate those features of it now clearly seen to be wrong, principles contrary to the teachings of history and a menace to the peace of the world, and turn itself into such a general representative body, the machinery of a governed world would then be complete. That would be a League of Nations to which the United States could and would subscribe.

The judicial branch of our governed world must develop *pari passu* with the political branch, for the former will exist to interpret the latter, and the latter must exist for the former. They are essentially complementary to each other, somewhat as our Congress and our Supreme Court are mutually complementary. The function of the League of Nations now is to turn its Assembly, its Council, its Disarmament Commission, its Mandate Commissions, its Health and Labor Commissions, and the rest, into a society of all the nations, meeting regularly and setting up their common agreements for the approval or disapproval of the various authorities back home. Thus there will be no violation of sovereignty, no strain upon common sense. We shall then have that meeting of minds, that common council

and association capable of providing those elements of law and order, those rules of action capable of expression, interpretation, and use in accord with the known and accepted principles of judicial settlement.

Thus, and thus only, can we establish the course of a just and peaceful international policy.

AS TO RUSSIA

WE HAVE sinned against Russia—some more than others, but we have sinned. Following the overthrow of the Empire, we wisely and proudly recognized the revolution. Since that time essentially every step taken by the nations outside Russia has been in the wrong direction. We have blockaded her ports; we have furnished arms to her enemies; we have treated her as incapable of solving her own problems. We have misrepresented the facts to her and about her, and the result has been a cumulative disaster. We ignored her at the Peace Conference in Paris. We have treated her as an Ishmael among the nations.

The problem has been a difficult one. It is true that there is no government duly elected by the people in Russia. The so-called Soviet Government is not a government by the consent of the governed; neither is it a government of laws. It is not, therefore, a democracy, but a tyranny. It is not Russian. It is not socialism. It is a class government, worse than Czarism, fed upon hatreds, fanaticisms, and violence.

We have been justified in refusing to recognize such a régime, self-assumed, increasingly bureaucratic and aggressive; but at no time have we been warranted in carrying on an armed intervention in that land.

Russia is having the experience of Britain in the middle of the seventeenth century and of France in the days of The Terror. It would have been well for the men in power outside Russia had they kept more clearly in mind those futile and discreditable policies during the French Revolution, policies shared in by Great Britain, Prussia, Austria, and Russia herself. Our attitude toward Russia should be the attitude of students rather than advocates or enemies. The thing going on there is not new; it is the result of one hundred years of revolutionary agitation, an agitation associated with the names of Robert Owen, Saint Simon, Fourier. The thing going on in Russia has its lessons for all of us. We should study those lessons, for they will be of importance to us as we work out our own problems, especially during the next few years. To combat the movement in Russia by force has strengthened the movement there, not because the thinking and hopeful men of Russia are in sympathy with bolshevism, but because all parties have found it necessary to unite in the name

of Sovereign Russia. We have created that situation. The Polish military excursion into Russia was a mistake, for it strengthened immeasurably the forces of Lenin. Our military assistance to Poland has generated an ill will against us, an ill will that is significant, for there are nearly two hundred millions of people in Russia. It is possible that we might have helped the friends of the Constituent Assembly had we gone about it immediately following the armistice. That time has passed. As soon as it appeared that such assistance was impracticable we should have withdrawn from Russia and from all attempts to coerce her by force of arms. The fate of Russia should have been left in the hands of the Russian people. The blockade should have been removed, trade relations with Russian people should have been opened, and, when a government had been established by the will of the people, that government should have been recognized. That should have been the policy then—we are of the opinion that it should be the policy now. We do not believe that there is any danger of a reappearance of an Imperial Russia. We are of the opinion that the provinces of that vast country are destined to become members of a Russian federation and that those parts are to maintain both their freedom and sovereignty. The right of self-determination will be insisted upon by Russia as a whole and by each of its parts in turn. We believe these things. But whether or not such is to be the outcome of events in that great country, we are quite convinced that nothing is to be gained by the meddling policy pursued toward that land since November 11, 1918. We may not approve of the Soviet domination of the Russian press, of the party dictatorship, or the attitude of the men in power toward the co-operative unions, of all the wild idealisms; but it is not our business to run the affairs of Russia. We should remember that Russia has a right to exist in her own way so long as she commits no unlawful acts against us. She has a right to set up any form of government she chooses, as long as she does not interfere with our rights. She has the right to the exclusive control over her own territory and over all persons within that territory. It is our duty to respect and, if need be, to protect Russia in those rights. Had we remembered these simple, fundamental principles, when about the business of trying to end the war and establish permanent world peace, the people of Russia would have long since taken control of their own affairs and, we doubt not, established, through some form of Constituent Assembly, a Russian Government which we could have recognized and done business with long since.

But the point here is that under the principle of self-determination there is one way for Russia to take her place again in the society of nations; that is, for the

Russian people to take hold of Russian affairs and control them. In the meantime our course is plain: leave Russian affairs to the Russians.

A HISTORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE OF PARIS

MEN interested in a governed world are trying to organize an "Institute of International Affairs" which, as Lord Grey has remarked, should do for today what history attempts to do for the past—collect materials, show the relation and perspective of events, together with their value. The British section of the institute, having in mind these aims, has already issued Volume I of "A History of the Peace Conference of Paris," edited by H. W. V. Temperley, published by Henry Frowde, Oxford University Press, Hodder and Stoughton. The price of the volume is forty-two shillings net.

This first volume is encouraging. The contributors are Englishmen and Americans, most of them present at the Paris Conference, all of them with exact information of the events with which they deal. They have given to us what seems to be an impartial record; yet it is a record that reveals, with no little success, the spirit of that historic series of conferences and decisions, beginning in the early days of December, 1918. It is not a work of special pleading for the Treaty of Versailles, yet it treats the Paris Conference as an honest and a constructive experiment in the interest of a promising international organization. It is a fact that the work is that of men close to the events which they describe. How true, therefore, the perspective may be remains for future historians to discover; for, as a London critic discriminatingly expresses it:

"Much must long remain obscure as to the inner history of the conference. We know from the letters of Gentz more about the motives of the chief actors in the Vienna Congress than the protocols tell us. The communications of Talleyrand to the French court give an insight into the course of events and passions of the actors not to be gathered from diplomatic verbiage. Only when the dispatches and letters of Castlereagh, Humboldt, Wellington, and Hardenberg saw the light were we fully aware of the jealousies, petty ambitions, and personal rivalries which counted for so much in 1815. Some day we shall read the private letters of the chief actors in the recent great drama; and there we shall find the *vrai verité* without the alloy always present in official documents or in memoirs written for purposes of self-exculpation or incrimination."

This first volume seems to be a fair and accurate description of the organization of the conference and the actual work of the groups composing it, giving to us a picture of the end of the war, the crises in Germany, the negotiations ending in the armistice. It gives also